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11. Introduction
Two important classes of models used to study the process of economic development are
economic growth and coordination failure models (the latter are sometimes referred to as poverty
trap, cumulative causation, or ‘Big Push’ models). In economic growth models, development
is analyzed by focussing on the trajectory (or time path) of the economy. On the other hand,
coordination failure models characterize the process of development as a transition between a
low-income equilibrium and a high-income equilibrium1.
Within the economic growth framework, Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991),
and Aghion and Howitt (1992), endogenized innovation at the level of the ﬁrm. Meanwhile, in
the coordination failure literature such an extension has not been forthcoming, and the models
remain based on exogenously determined technology.
The main contribution of this paper with respect to the coordination failure literature is
the introduction of endogenously (and strategically) determined technological capability, at the
level of the ﬁrm1. This gives rise to a novel characterization of the industrialization process.
As industrialization takes place, the economy needs to cross a sequence of take-oﬀs in order to
achieve a high-income equilibrium. Moreover, for the economy to cross these take-oﬀs, certain
conditions must be satisﬁed. Otherwise, some of the take-oﬀs could be bypassed, and the
industrialization process would be thwarted. In particular, we introduce an industrial take-oﬀ
and a technological take-oﬀ. The industrial take-oﬀ activates an industrial expansion. Once
this process has been triggered, the economy may (or may not) cross a second take-oﬀ point:
t e c h n o l o g i c a lt a k e - o ﬀ .I ft h ee c o n o m yc r o s s e st h et e c h n o l o g i c a lt a k e - o ﬀ ,i tw i l la c h i e v ear i s ei n
technological capability and a higher income level than would have been the case otherwise.
The notion of a sequence of take-oﬀs is reminiscent of Rostow’s ‘stages of development’ (Ros-
tow, 1956, 1959). We provide formal foundations to the idea that an economy must traverse a
number of phases in its development process. However, that is probably as far as the similarities
run, as the workings of the economy and the phases themselves bear little resemblance to Ros-
tow’s original characterization2. More recently, Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005), ﬁnd
that growth often occurs in spurts of limited duration. Our model goes some way towards pro-
viding theoretical foundations for this empirical regularity. In our framework, the growth spurts
would be associated with the crossing of the take-oﬀs. Moreover, the view of the development
process as the crossing of a series of take-oﬀs is more general than our model. In general, the
1Contributions to the theory of economic growth include Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956), Cass (1965), Uzawa
(1965), Koopmans (1965), Phelps (1966), Shell (1966), and Lucas (1988), inter alia. The coordination failure
ﬁeld features the works of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Lewis (1954), with subsequent contributions by Okuno-
Fujiwara (1988), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Matsuyama (1991, 1992), Rodriguez-Clare (1996), Rodrik
(1996), Venables (1996) and Graham and Temple (2006). There are, of course, models of economic growth which
also feature multiple equilibria and poverty traps (for example, Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 1990). Our interest,
however, lies with the coordination failure literature.
1The notion of technological capability refers to the knowledge of workers within the ﬁrm (Fransman and
King 1984, Lall 1992, Sutton 2004, Tong 2005). The modelling of technological capability in this study follows
the endogenous sunk costs literature (Sutton 1991, 1998). In this literature, ﬁxed outlays raise consumers’
willingness to pay for a good, in the form of an increase in a shift parameter for the ﬁrm’s demand schedule, with
this parameter representing technological capability. The technological capability of a ﬁrm can also be used to
represent the ﬁrm’s product quality, and in this study the terms will be used interchangeably.
2This theory ignited a lively debate, many aspects of which remain active today. For detailed expositions, see
the conference proceedings in Rostow (1963), in particular, the contributions of Kuznets (p. 22-43) and Solow (p.
468-474). For a recent perspective, see Graham and Temple (2006).
2take-oﬀs are not limited to the industrial and technological take-oﬀ. As an extension for further
research, we outline a third possible take-oﬀ, international take-oﬀ, which would occur once the
economy becomes suﬃciently competitive to capture a share of the international market.
Our point of departure is that not all industrialization processes are alike. For example, the
industrialization processes followed by some North-East Asian economies (Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan) during the twentieth century diﬀer markedly from those followed in most develop-
ing nations. Of course, this is not to say that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan followed identical
paths; and substantive diﬀerences between these economies must be acknowledged. Nonethe-
less, the notion of a sequence of take-oﬀs can help us to uncover some of the mechanisms
behind the industrial success of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, as opposed to other develop-
ing economies: the North-East Asian economies successfully entered into many high-technology
industries, whereas other, less successful industrializers were characterized, on average, by in-
dustrial expansion along low-technology trajectories. Firms like Samsung, Hyundai, Sony, and
Toyota are evidence of North-East Asian entry into high-tech sectors. Why are there are so few
such ﬁrms outside the OECD and North-East Asia? This is an issue worthy of attention, and
we shall investigate its analytical underpinnings.
Looking further back in time, we can provide an alternative interpretation of our results.
We can think of the ﬁrst industrial revolution (late eighteenth century Europe) as an example
of industrial expansion along low-tech trajectories. Later industrial expansions have often been
accompanied by the emergence of research and development, and expansion has occurred along
increasingly high-tech trajectories. Our model, then, reveals some of the mechanisms behind
such industrialization processes. We shall show how a change in the type of expansion leads
to fundamental changes in the workings of the economy, particularly with respect to market
structure and the nature of investment.
Within the coordination failure framework, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) formalized
Lewis’ (1954) dual-economy analysis: there is a traditional sector with constant returns to
scale and a modern sector which features increasing returns to scale. Initially, the economy
produces only in the traditional sector. Due to a coordination failure, it is not proﬁtable to
enter the modern sector. If this coordination failure can be overcome (possibly by some central
coordination mechanism), workers shift to the modern sector, their wages increase and demand
for modern goods rises in parallel. Thus, a Big Push of industrialization is achieved.
Rodrik (1995, 1996) provides an interpretation of the East Asian Miracle based on coordina-
tion failures. He proposes that these economies had the required resources to operate at a high
level of income, but were unable to do so because they were subject to a coordination failure.
In Rodrik’s view, East Asian governments coordinated a switch from a low-income equilibrium
to a high-income equilibrium, and it was this transition which sparked growth.
Notwithstanding its important contributions, the coordination failure literature does not
consider the type of industry which is expanding. Is it low-tech manufacturing? Or is it high-
tech? What are the implications? These questions are central to this study.
Informal Description of the Economy
Our hypothetical economy consists of three sectors. There are demand and cost linkages
between two sectors, producing ﬁnal and intermediate goods, respectively. In addition to these
3sectors, there is a residual (rest of the economy) sector, which is used to close the model. The
intermediate goods industry features an oligopoly with increasing returns to scale. This industry
uses labor to produce intermediate goods and to achieve a certainlevel of technological capability.
The ﬁnal goods industry is perfectly competitive and exhibits constant returns to scale. It uses
intermediate goods and labor to produce ﬁnal output. The demand and cost linkages constitute
a pecuniary externality: on the one hand, an increase in ﬁnal output beneﬁts intermediate ﬁrms
by raising demand for intermediate goods (demand linkage). On the other hand, an expansion
in the intermediate industry leads to lower price/quality ratios for intermediate goods through
either reduced concentration, or enhanced technological capability (intermediate goods’ quality).
In turn, this reduces costs for the ﬁnal goods industry (cost linkage).
In the intermediate industry, ﬁrms play a three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the entry
decision is taken. In the second stage, ﬁrms choose how much to invest in building up their
technological capability. In the ﬁnal stage, ﬁrms compete àl aCournot. In this stage, ﬁrms
with higher technological capability enjoy a greater level of demand for a given price. By
increasing their technological capability, intermediate ﬁrms collectively increase intermediate
industry market size. This eﬀect, however, is not internalized by the individual ﬁrm and is
treated as a second type of externality (in addition to the pecuniary externalities discussed
above). Modelling technological competition as a stage game provides a very ﬂexible structure
which can be easily extended to deal with process innovation, learning-by-doing within the ﬁrm,
as well as network eﬀects (as discussed in Sutton, 1998, chapters 14 and 15).
The description of the economy is completed by considering the labor market and the ‘rest
of the economy’ sector. For simplicity, labor supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. Labor
demand derives both from the intermediate and ﬁnal goods sectors, as well as from the ‘rest of
the economy’. Labor productivity in the ‘rest of the economy’ is diminishing: as demand for
labor from the other industries rises, less labor is used in the ‘rest of the economy’, its marginal
productivity rises, and, since labor is perfectly mobile, wages increase for the whole economy.
For parsimony, we introduce a ﬁxed labor cost in the ‘rest of the economy’, and this ensures
that the sector features zero proﬁts.
The model exhibits two types of equilibria. First, we have a low-income or coordination
failure equilibrium. This features high concentration in the intermediate goods industry, a
high price/quality ratio for intermediate goods, low output in both sectors, and a low wage
rate. Second, we have a high-income (developed economy) equilibrium. This corresponds with
high output in both sectors, a low price/quality ratio for intermediate goods, and high wages.
There are two possible outcomes in this case. One outcome is that investment in technological
capability is zero at the high-income equilibrium, in which case the intermediate goods industry
features lower concentration, relative to the low-income equilibrium. The other outcome is a
high-income equilibrium with positive investment in technological capability. Investment in
technological capability is carried out through ﬁxed outlays. This raises entry costs and leads
to a concentration level that is independent of market size: As market size grows, ﬁrms increase
investment in technological capability, thereby increasing their ﬁxed outlays. This occurs to
such an extent that further entry is unproﬁtable, and concentration does not change.
The adjustment mechanism along the equilibrium switching process is of a fundamentally
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the economy can relieve the coordination failure. Then, it switches from the low-income to the
high-income equilibrium. If the technological take-oﬀ is not crossed, the equilibrium switching
process features a rising number of ﬁrms in the intermediate goods industry, and this reduces the
price of intermediate goods. As the price of intermediate goods falls, output in both intermediate
and ﬁnal goods industries rises, reducing employment in the rest of the economy. As the rest of
the economy contracts, workers’ marginal productivity rises for this sector, increasing wages for
the whole economy. This process continues until the economy is at the high-income equilibrium,
without investment in technological capability. On the other hand, if the technological take-oﬀ
is crossed, then the intermediate goods industry features a constant level of concentration. The
equilibrium switching process now exhibits increasing technological capability, which reduces
the price/quality ratio of intermediate goods. This increases output of intermediate and ﬁnal
goods, again leading to reduced employment in the rest of the economy and higher wages. The
process takes the economy to the high-income equilibrium, this time with growth in technological
capability.
In the transition from the low-income to the high-income equilibrium, the economy is able
to cross the technological take-oﬀ only if the wage rate associated with this take-oﬀ is not too
high. This implies the existence of a window of opportunity through which the economy must
ﬁt in order to trigger the expansion of technological capability. If wages rise too rapidly, then
the window of opportunity is missed and the technological take-oﬀ is bypassed. In this case,
the economy switches to the high-income equilibrium in the absence of technological capability
growth. On the other hand, if wages rise relatively slowly, then the economy ﬁts through the
window of opportunity, the technological take-oﬀ is crossed, and the economy ends up in the high-
income equilibrium with investment in technological capability. The high-income equilibrium
with investment in technological capability features a higher wage rate than the high-income
equilibrium without investment in technological capability.
All equilibria are equally feasible, in the sense that the economy’s resources do not change
when moving from one equilibrium to another. All that may change is the distribution of re-
sources between sectors, and technological capability or market structure in the intermediate
industry. An essential assumption is that ﬁrms are unable to commit to the high-income equi-
librium, that is, there is a coordination failure. The question is, then, what instruments can be
used to relieve the coordination failure? We shall see that trade policy can be used to this end.
Both intermediate and ﬁnal goods sectors produce tradable goods, and tariﬀs can be imposed
on either sector. Results hinge on whether we consider the second or ﬁrst best scenario.
On the one hand, second best analysis presumes the existence of an oligopolistic intermediate
industry. In this case, a combination of prudent tariﬀ reductions for intermediate goods and
tariﬀ increases for ﬁnal products can destroy the low-income equilibrium and trigger the switch
to the high-income equilibrium. Furthermore, we specify the conditions for the transition to be
accompanied by a rise in technological capability.
On the other hand, ﬁrst best analysis suggests that if the international price of intermediate
goods is lower than their domestic price at the high wage equilibrium, then the intermediate in-
dustry should be eliminated through tariﬀ reductions. This would lead to higher wages through
5increased demand for labor from the ﬁnal goods industry. However, political economy consid-
erations render second best analysis increasingly valuable, since eliminating an entire industry
will, at the very least, elicit strong resistance from its stakeholders.
Since we are modelling a small open economy, the rest of the world is taken to be exogenous.
We assume that there is a suﬃciently large wedge between the price of domestic intermediate
goods and their international price, ruling out the possibility of exports. This simpliﬁes matters
by conﬁning attention to the domestic market.
Finally, we compare the social planner’s solution to the decentralized equilibrium. If the
social planner can ensure marginal cost pricing for intermediate goods and choose the level
of technological capability, then the second best market structure for the intermediate goods
industry is a national monopoly. Moreover, the ﬁrst best entails the demise of the intermediate
industry. However, the centrally planned outcome does not always lead to higher real income,
relative to the decentralized equilibrium.
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the analysis. First, in order to focus on
ﬁrms’ strategic choice of technological capability and its consequences for development, we have
not considered issues relating to ﬁnancial market imperfections or human capital. It is well
known that both notions are crucial to the process of development, but their inclusion lies
outside the scope of this study3. Second, the analysis is static. It would be desirable to extend
the model to a dynamic framework. However, the incorporation of forward looking ﬁrms poses
diﬃculties inherent to the modelling of dynamic oligopoly. This is a priority in our research
agenda, and is left for future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in section 2. Equilibrium
is characterized in section 3. Section 4 discusses trade policy. In section 5 we discuss the ﬁrst best
and compare the decentralized equilibrium outcome with that achievable by a social planner.
Section 6 oﬀers conclusions and discusses extensions for further research. Appendices A and
B oﬀer details of longer derivations and proofs, while Appendix C presents comparative statics
results for parameters not treated in the text.
2. A Model of Coordination Failure with Endogenous Technological Capability
We begin by analyzing the ﬁnal goods industry. We then describe the intermediate goods
industry. Finally, the labor market is described in conjunction with the ‘rest of the economy’
sector.
2.1. Final Goods
This industry is perfectly competitive and features constant returns to scale. The production
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input, xi is intermediate good i (produced solely by intermediate ﬁrm i =1 ,...,N +1 )5,a n dα
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w is the wage rate, pi is the price of intermediate good i, ui is the technological capability of
3A survey on ﬁnancial markets and development can be found in Levine (1997). For human capital and
development, see Benhabib and Spiegel (1994).
4The production function is a Cobb-Douglas which has been multiplied by a constant, given by α
−α (1 − α)
α−1.
The introduction of this constant simpliﬁes subsequent expressions and does not alter any results.
5We denote the number of intermediate ﬁrms by N +1, since this will make subsequent algebraic expressions
more organized.
6intermediate producer i,a n dϕ ∈ [0,1] is the extent to which quality reduces costs (It will be seen
b e l o wt h a ti ta l s or e p r e s e n t sa ne x t e r n a l i t y . 6). Final goods producers’ costs are non standard,
and a brief explanation is appropriate. An intermediate ﬁrm’s technological capability (the
quality of its product) is relevant for ﬁnal goods producers to the extent that it reduces costs
for the latter. This can be justiﬁed by considering how low quality inputs hinder production; for
example, by making the production process more prone to mechanical failure or by generating
losses due to unsellable products.
The production technology implies that intermediate goods are perfect substitutes, so ﬁnal
goods producers choose the intermediate good with the lowest price/quality ratio and make all
their planned purchases from the ﬁrm oﬀering the chosen variety. This implies that in order
to achieve positive market share, intermediate ﬁrms must have identical price/quality ratios:
pi/ui = λ,f o ra l li. In a symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate ﬁrms feature identical prices,
quantities and technological capabilities. In this case we write the solution for the ﬁnal goods
producers’ problem in terms of p/u (as opposed to pi/ui), and denote aggregate intermediate
output by X =( N +1 ) x instead of
￿N+1
i=1 xi.
Solving the ﬁnal goods producers’ cost minimization problem yields the cost function,
C(w,p/u,Y )=wα (p/uϕ)
1−αY . Constant returns to scale and perfect competition imply zero
proﬁts at equilibrium, so average and marginal costs coincide with price. Whence, the price of






Along this schedule ﬁnal goods producers minimize costs and earn zero proﬁts. Equation (1) will
be one of the conditions used to characterize the equilibrium of the economy. Throughout the
analysis, q will be exogenously given, and 1 ￿ q ￿ w is assumed. For a symmetric equilibrium,
equation (1) allows us to express conditional factor demands in terms of ﬁnal goods industry





X = (1 −α)
qY
p/uϕ. (3)
This completes the description of the ﬁnal goods industry. We now turn to the intermediate
goods industry.
2.2. Intermediate Goods
Intermediate ﬁrms play a three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage the entry decision is made. In
the second stage, ﬁrms incur ﬁxed outlays to attain a certain technological capability (that is,
product quality). In the third stage ﬁrms compete àl aCournot. We seek a Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium (Selten, 1975), and the game is solved by backward induction.
In the third stage, intermediate ﬁrms choose quantity (xi) in order to maximize gross proﬁts,
6There are other alternatives for introducing ui into the downstream ﬁrms’ problem. For example, it could be
introduced as a multiplicative factor in the production function, yielding Y =( Ly/α)
α
￿￿N+1
i=1 uixi/(1 − α)
￿1−α
.
However, the chosen representation gives a more parsimonious speciﬁcation.
7πi = (pi − wc)xi, taking rivals’ quantities, technological capabilities, and market structure as
given. The labor requirement for production of an extra unit of xi is a constant (c). Intermediate
ﬁrms oﬀer a unique price/quality ratio, deﬁned by pi/ui = λ for all i. Intermediate industry
revenue can then be written as S =
￿N+1
j=1 pjxj = λ
￿N+1






The third stage proﬁt function for intermediate ﬁrms can be written as πi = (λui − wc)xi.




uixi = wc. (5)
Routine calculations (shown in Appendix A) yield the following solutions for the (stage 3)




































Quantity, price and proﬁt are increasing in the ﬁrm’s own technological capability, and decreas-
ing in its rivals’ technological capabilities7. Equation (7) will serve as the basis for one of the
equilibrium conditions used to solve the model. If ﬁrms choose symmetric technological capa-
bilities, setting ui = uj yields x = wcN/(N +1)
2, p = wc(N +1)/N and π = S/(N +1)
2,t h e
usual results under Cournot competition. It is straightforward to see that quantity, price and
proﬁt are decreasing in the number of ﬁrms8. Moreover, total output of intermediate goods,
given by (N +1 ) x, is increasing in the number of ﬁrms.
In the second stage, ﬁrms choose ui to maximize net proﬁt: πi − F(ui),w h e r eπi is given
in (8) and F(ui) denotes the ﬁxed outlays function, F(ui)=wεu
β
i . ε is a minimum labor
requirement for entry. The labor requirement to achieve technological capability level ui is given
by εu
β
i , which is convex in ui (β>1). It is convenient to assume ui ￿ 1 and ε ￿ 1.Z e r o
investment in technological capability gives ui =1and F = wε, an exogenous entry cost. We
label this the ‘exogenous technological capabilities’ case. The case of ui > 1 shall be labelled
‘endogenous technological capabilities’.
Before solving for the optimal technological capability, let us solve for industry revenue from
equation (3). This yields
S =( 1−α)qYuϕ. (9)
7The eﬀect on quantity would appear to be non-monotonic. However, diﬀerentiating xi with respect to ui,i t
becomes clear that xi is increasing in ui so long as the market harbors at least two ﬁrms.
8Quantity is decreasing in the number of ﬁrms so long as there are at least two ﬁrms in the intermediate
goods industry.
8In solving for the optimal ui, intermediate ﬁrms are assumed to take S as given. Thus the (sym-
metric) quality level entering S constitutes an externality. By increasing their own technological
capability and by the symmetric response of rivals, ﬁrms increase overall industry sales. This
market expansion eﬀect is not taken into account when ﬁrms choose their own investment. The







from which we solve for the symmetric (Nash) equilibrium level of technological capability:















Equilibrium in the entry stage requires that gross proﬁts (8) just cover ﬁxed outlays, F(ui).

















+1 if u>1. (12)
For simplicity, the number of ﬁrms is treated throughout as a continuous variable9.I f u = 1,
the number of ﬁrms is increasing in market size and decreasing in wages and entry costs. This
is a familiar result from Cournot competition with (exogenous) entry costs, in which a larger
market size leads to an increasingly fragmented market structure. In the limit, as S/ε →∞ ,
(N +1) →∞ , and price converges to marginal cost (wc). This is the convergence property:
market structure converges to the competitive solution as entry costs become small or industry
revenue becomes large (Gabszewicks and Vial, 1972; Novshek and Sonnenschein, 1978). On
the other hand as ε → S￿w, we converge to the monopoly solution. In this limit, we need to
impose a ceiling on price (otherwise x → 0 and p →∞ ). This ceiling will be the import price of
intermediate goods (see Assumption A1b, below).
If u>1, the number of ﬁrms depends only on β, and is independent of market size. In the
literature on market structure, this has been labelled the non-convergence property (Shaked and
Sutton, 1983). It refers to the notion that as market size becomes large, market structure does
not become fragmented. What happens in this case is that, as the market expands, incumbents
increase their investments in technological capability (see equation 10), eﬀectively preventing
further entry.
2.3. The Labor Market and the Rest of the Economy
Labor supply is perfectly inelastic at Le. Labor demand comes from the ﬁnal and intermedi-
ate goods industries and a ‘rest of the economy’ sector. Labor market clearing can be stated as
9The model can be readily extended to a discrete number of entrants by taking the integer part of N +1and
allowing for non-zero proﬁts in the intermediate industry (as discussed in Venables, 1996). The insights gained
by this exercise are not substantially diﬀerent from those presented here.
9Le = Lx +Ly + Lr,w h e r eLx, Ly and Lr denote, respectively, employment in the intermediate
and ﬁnal goods industries, and in the rest of the economy. Labor demand from the ﬁnal goods
industry is given by equation (2). Labor demand from the intermediate industry can be written
as Lx =( N +1)(xc+εuβ). The ‘rest of the economy’ exhibits diminishing marginal productiv-
ity of labor: as demand for labor rises in the intermediate and ﬁnal goods sectors, less labor is
available to the rest of the economy and its marginal productivity rises. Since labor is perfectly
mobile between industries, this pushes up the wage rate for the whole economy. To capture this




= MPL(Lr) MPL￿ < 0, MPL￿￿ < 0, (13)
where MPL(.) denotes the marginal product of labor in the ‘rest of the economy’, MPL￿ and
MPL￿￿ denote (respectively) ﬁrst and second derivatives, q is the price of the ﬁnal good, and
w is the nominal wage rate per unit of labor endowment. Whence, the real wage rate is a
decreasing and concave function of the amount of labor used in the ‘rest of the economy’. To
see why concavity is required, note that a rising wage imposes an external diseconomy on the
intermediate and ﬁnal goods sectors. For industrialization to take place, this eﬀect needs to
be curtailed: the marginal productivity of labor (MPL) must not fall too quickly, so that the
wage rate does not rise too steeply as intermediate and ﬁnal outputs expand (thereby reducing
employment in the ‘rest of the economy’). We assume that proﬁts in the ‘rest of the economy’
sector are exhausted by labor costs. This is ensured by the presence of a ﬁxed labor cost, which
is already accounted for in Lr.
Before turning to a full analysis of the model, it is convenient to remark on a basic feature of
equilibrium, and to use this to motivate an assumption regarding a functional form we wish to
impose. It is easy to see that there is a negative, monotonic relationship between employment
in the ‘rest of the economy’ and the output of ﬁnal goods. We can therefore deﬁne a function
ω(Y ) as follows10:
MPL(Lr) ≡ ω(Y ) ω￿ > 0, ω￿￿ < 0,
where ω￿ and ω￿￿ denote the ﬁrst and second derivatives. Rather than choose a speciﬁc functional




= ω(Y )=Y 1/θ with θ>1. (14)
This reduced form equation appropriately captures the behavior of the system, and completes
the description of the model11. Prior to the analysis of equilibrium, let us discuss a threshold
which changes the workings of the economy in a fundamental manner.
10Note that there is no need to include intermediate output (X)i nω (.),s i n c eX is a monotonically increasing
function of ﬁnal output (Y ). Furthermore, inclusion of technological capability (u) or market structure (N +1 )
is also redundant, since X is a monotonic function of these.
11The reduced form wage equation in (13) has allowed us to close the system without the need to model
consumers explicitly. An alternative model with consumers yields similar results and is available upon request.
The above formulation was chosen because it allows a more parsimonious treatment.
10Remark 1: Technological Take-Oﬀ
Since technological capability is bounded from below (u ￿ 1), there will be a technological
take-oﬀ, at which ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to begin investing in technological capability. If, using
(14), we substitute Y in (10), we can see that technological capability is increasing in the wage
rate. Hence, there will be a wage rate associated with the technological take-oﬀ, which we denote











For w ￿ wT, the economy functions with exogenous technological capability (u = 1). In this
case the number of ﬁrms is given by (11) and all other equations simplify by setting u =1 .F o r
w>w T, investment in technological capability is activated and the number of ﬁrms is given by
(12). The ‘technological take-oﬀ’ threshold (wT)i si n c r e a s i n gi nq, ε, α, β and decreasing in θ
￿.12
3. Equilibrium
An equilibrium is constituted by a price for intermediate goods (p), a technological capability
f o ri n t e r m e d i a t eﬁ r m s( u), a number of intermediate ﬁrms (N +1), a wage (w) and an allocation
of labor (Lx, Ly and Lr) such that:
1) The intermediate industry is in a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, in which:
i) Firms choose Cournot-Nash quantities in stage 1.
ii) Firms choose Nash equilibrium technological capabilities in stage 2.
iii) The number of entrants implies zero proﬁts in stage 3.
2) Firms in the ﬁnal goods industry minimize costs and earn zero proﬁts.
3) The labor market clears.
4) Goods markets clear.
The following assumptions are introduced in order to simplify the analysis:











A2. θ − 1 >β− ϕ.
The role of A1a is to avoid division by zero in one of the equilibrium conditions (condition
SS, below). In order to conﬁne subsequent analysis to values of w lying above w∗, A1b places an
upper bound on the price of imports (pm). A2 ensures that equilibrium condition S￿S￿ (deﬁned
below) is downward sloping. Although other cases are admissible, A2 ensures a clearer insight.
This will be discussed in more detail below.
Equilibria for this economy are characterized by three conditions. The ﬁrst condition ensures
equilibrium in the ﬁnal goods industry, that is, ﬁrms in the ﬁnal goods industry minimize costs
and earn zero proﬁts. The second condition ensures labor market clearing and a Subgame Perfect
12For clarity, we will use the symbol ‘￿’ to mark the end of remarks and propositions, and the symbol ‘￿’t o
mark the end of proofs.
11Nash Equilibrium in the intermediate industry. Subgame perfection implies that no ﬁrm can
ﬁnd an optimal deviation in either quantity or technological capability (as implied by the ﬁrst
order conditions for stages 2 and 3 of the intermediate industry game), and no ﬁrm wishes to
enter or exit (as implied by the zero proﬁt condition in stage 1). The third equilibrium condition
is that the domestic price/quality ratio of intermediate products be less than the price/quality
ratio of imports, denoted by pm/u (Otherwise, intermediate ﬁrms would not achieve a positive
market share.).
To obtain the ﬁrst equilibrium condition, solve for p/u from equation (1). This condition
is labelled D￿D￿, and it holds for w>w T.W h e n w ￿ wT, the model features exogenous














1−α if w >w T (u>1). (D￿D￿)
DD and D￿D￿ are downward sloping in w: in order to break even, and for a given price of ﬁnal
output (q), a higher wage rate (w) allows a smaller price/quality ratio to be paid for intermediate
goods13. DD and D￿D￿ are convex with respect to w.
To obtain the second equilibrium condition, divide the symmetric counterpart to (7) by u.
For w ￿ wT,w es e tu = 1 and use (11) to substitute N, and (14) to replace Y. This results in
the SS schedule, shown below. For w>w T, the condition is given by S￿S￿, in which the number


















if w>w T (u>1). (S￿S￿)
There are two eﬀects at work in the SS schedule. The ﬁrst is that as w increases, the marginal
cost of intermediate goods rises linearly, thereby increasing price. This eﬀect will make SS
upward sloping at high values of the wage rate, and can be observed in the numerator of SS (wc).
The second eﬀect operates through the number of ﬁrms: the wage rate increase reﬂects higher
demand for labor by the intermediate and ﬁnal goods sectors, which means higher production
levels inboth sectors. As sales in the intermediate industry rise, the number of entrants increases,
and the price of intermediate goods falls, making SS downward sloping in w.T h i se ﬀ e c tc a nb e
observed in the denominator of SS, and is prevalent at low values of the wage rate.
In S￿S￿ t h en u m b e ro fﬁ r m si sﬁ x e df o rag i v e nβ. As before, S￿S￿ is increasing linearly in
the wage rate through the eﬀect in the numerator. The second eﬀect now operates through
technological capability. Technological capability increases with the wage rate14,a n dt h i st e n d s
to make S￿S￿ downward sloping in w.
To characterize the equilibria of the economy, consider ﬁrst the case of w ￿ wT (u = 1).
13To see that D
￿D
￿ is downward sloping in w, substitute (14) and (10) into D
￿D
￿.
14To see that technological capability is increasing in the wage rate, substitute Y f r o m( 1 4 )i n t o( 1 0 ) ,a n d
recall that θ>1.













The values of w which solve (16) are candidates for equilibrium wage rates. We will see below
(Proposition 1), that (16) has, at most, two positive real roots.
Secondly, consider the case w>w T (u>1). In this case, the corresponding equilibrium
conditions are D￿D￿ and S￿S￿. Combining (14), (10), S￿S￿,a n dD￿D￿, yields an explicit solution
for the equilibrium wage rate:












We are now ready to provide an account of how the model works. This is done with the aid
of Figure 1. In this ﬁgure, the vertical axis measures the price/quality ratio for intermediate
goods, while the horizontal axis measures the wage rate. Figure 1 depicts schedules DD, D￿D￿,
SS,a n dS￿S￿. Schedules DD and SS are shown as thick lines up to wT. To the right of
wT, the actual equilibrium conditions are given by D￿D￿ and S￿S￿,a n dDD and SS are shown
as thin lines (The latter would be equilibrium conditions only if technological capability is
assumed to be exogenous throughout.). The conﬁguration shown in Figure 1 relies upon some
restrictions on parameter values. These will be speciﬁed in a precise manner in Proposition 1
(conditions C1-C4, below). The analysis proceeds by ﬁrst considering the case of exogenous
technological capabilities (subsection 3.1 assumes u = 1). Subsequently, technological capability
is endogenized (subsection 3.2).
3.1 Exogenous Technological Capability
In this case, the focus is on the DD and SS schedules, including their continuations (that
is, the thin lines), with u = 1.T h e DD schedule implies cost minimization and zero proﬁts
for the ﬁnal goods industry. Pairs (p,w) lying below DD yield positive proﬁts for ﬁnal goods
producers, while pairs lying above imply negative proﬁts. Any equilibria must lie on the DD
locus, since that is the only way the ﬁnal goods industry can be in equilibrium, for a given price
of ﬁnal goods, q.
SS ensures labor market clearing and a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the interme-
diate industry. With exogenous technological capability, a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
in the intermediate industry requires Cournot-Nash quantities in the ﬁnal stage subgame, and
zero proﬁts in the ﬁrst stage subgame (The subgame involving choice of technological capability
is assumed inactive in this subsection.). For given intermediate output and number of interme-
diate ﬁrms, pairs (p,w) lying below SS imply negative proﬁts in the intermediate industry and
ﬁrms exit. As intermediate ﬁrms exit, the price of intermediate goods rises until SS is reached.
Conversely, pairs (p,w) above SS imply positive proﬁts in the intermediate industry and entry
follows. This drives down the price of intermediate goods, returning to SS.






















Figure 1. Equilibrium conditions: DD, D￿D￿, SS, S￿S￿ and import price/quality ratio (pm/u).
The (post-tariﬀ) price/quality ratio for imports of intermediate goods is shown as a horizontal
line at pm/u.F o r u = 1, this is simply the price of imports (as opposed to the price/quality
ratio). In equilibrium, the price of intermediate goods is given by the lesser of pm and SS.
Accordingly, the section of SS above point A cannot be part of an equilibrium: If intermediate
ﬁrms set their price above the price of imports, their market share will be zero. Thus, to the left
of point A, the price of intermediate goods is ﬁxed at pm. Nonetheless, with a ﬁxed price for
intermediate goods, the intermediate industry can still achieve a Subgame Perfect Nash Equi-
librium, even out of the SS locus. In this case, the number of intermediate ﬁrms falls in order to
make proﬁts zero, but the subsequent (upward) price adjustment does not take place. Clearly,
in this case the number of intermediate ﬁrms is smaller than when prices can ﬂuctuate freely
(as is the case when the economy lies on the SS schedule).
In Figure 1 there are two equilibria which correspond to the case of u =1 : E1 and E2. E1 is
a coordination failure (low-income) equilibrium, while E2 is a developed economy (high-income)
equilibrium. Let us ﬁrst analyze E1. This equilibrium features a high price for intermediate
goods (set marginally below pm), low output of intermediate and ﬁnal goods, a large ‘rest of
the economy’ sector, and therefore, a low wage rate. A high price for intermediate goods is
associated with a small number of ﬁrms in the intermediate sector. In turn, high concentration
is supported by small intermediate industry sales. The number of intermediate ﬁrms operating
at E1 is smaller than the number associated with SS for wage level wE1.T h i si sb e c a u s e(p,w)
pairs lying below SS imply negative proﬁts for intermediate ﬁrms, so exit ensues until proﬁts
with price pm are driven to zero. Note that at E1 there is no optimal deviation for any individual
ﬁrm: to the left of E1, DD lies above pm, hence it is proﬁtable for intermediate ﬁrms to enter,
and intermediate output expands. As intermediate and ﬁnal outputs rise, less labor is used in
14the ‘rest of the economy’, and wages rise, shifting the economy back to E1.T o t h e r i g h t o f
E1, DD is below pm, thus intermediate ﬁrms exit, increasing the price of intermediate goods.
Meanwhile, output falls in both sectors, the ‘rest of the economy’ expands, and wages fall, until
the economy returns to E1.
We now turn to equilibrium E2. This is characterized by a low price for intermediate goods,
high output in both industries, low output in the rest of the economy, and a high wage rate.
Low concentration in the intermediate industry generates an intermediate goods price which is
lower than the price of imports. The low intermediate price supports a high output of ﬁnal
goods, which in turn implies high intermediate output. Again, there is no optimal deviation for
any individual ﬁrm from this equilibrium: to the left of E2, DD is above SS,i n t e r m e d i a t eﬁ r m s
earn positive proﬁts, and entry follows. This reduces intermediate price, intermediate and ﬁnal
outputs increase, the rest of the economy shrinks, wages rise, and the economy shifts back to
E2.T ot h er i g h to fE2, DD is below SS, intermediate ﬁrms earn negative proﬁts, exit ensues,
the price of intermediate goods rises, output of intermediate and ﬁnal goods contracts, the rest
of the economy expands, wages fall, and the economy returns to E2.
Remark 2: Industrial Take-Oﬀ
Between E1 and E2, there is another crossing of DD and SS. T h i so c c u r sa tt h ep o i n t
labelled ‘industrial take-oﬀ’, associated with wage wI. Although it may seem that this should
be a candidate for equilibrium, it is easy to see that at this point there is an optimal local
deviation for any intermediate ﬁrm: to the left of wI,w eh a v eDD < SS, implying negative
proﬁts. The optimal deviation takes the form of exit. This increases the price of intermediate
goods. In turn, sales of intermediate goods fall together with ﬁnal output. As labor demand
from the intermediate and ﬁnal goods industries contracts, the rest of the economy expands,
reducing wages. This process shifts the economy to E1.T ot h er i g h to fwI,w eh a v eDD > SS,
implying positive proﬁts. In this case, the optimal deviation takes the form of entry, which
reduces the price of intermediate goods. Output of intermediate and ﬁnal goods rises, reducing
employment in the rest of the economy and raising wages. The process continues until E2 is
reached. The ‘industrial take-oﬀ’ label refers to the idea that if the economy crosses this point
from above, a large industrial expansion follows15 ￿.
Notice that there is an optimal collective deviation from E1. If intermediate ﬁrms are able
to coordinate on a collective increase in output, and this increase in output is suﬃciently large
to shift the economy past wI, then the economy switches to E2. Nonetheless, if intermediate
ﬁrms are located at E1 but cannot achieve such a collective deviation, we have a coordination
failure16.
15Of course, this point also admits the converse connotation of a ‘de-industrialization threshold’: if the economy
crosses this point from below, then it switches to E1.
16In the past, equilibria E1 and E2 would usually have been called ‘stable’ equilibria, while the industrial take-
oﬀ point would have been called an ‘unstable’ equilibrium. This terminology would imply an implicit dynamic
adjustment process. However, because the model is static, the introduction of an ad-hoc adjustment process is not
entirely satisfactory. A superior approach would be to allow forward looking behavior by all ﬁrms, introducing
dynamic oligopoly into the model. This is left for future research.
153.2 Endogenous Technological Capability
Below the technological take-oﬀ (w ￿ wT), we have u = 1, and the analysis proceeds in
accordance with the exogenous technological capability case. Once the technological take-oﬀ is
crossed (w>w T), investment in technological capability is triggered (u>1), and the relevant
equilibrium conditions are given by D￿D￿ and S￿S￿.
As before, D￿D￿ ensures cost minimization and zero proﬁts in the ﬁnal goods industry. Pairs
(p,w) lying below D￿D￿ generate positive proﬁts for ﬁnal goods producers, and pairs (p,w) lying
above D￿D￿ are associated with negative proﬁts. Hence, equilibria must lie on the D￿D￿ locus,
for a given price of ﬁnal goods (q). D￿D￿ exhibits a steeper slope than DD.T h i so c c u r sb e c a u s e
technological capability is increasing in the wage rate.
S￿S￿ implies labor market clearing and a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the interme-
diate goods industry. A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium for the intermediate goods industry
now requires Cournot-Nash production in the ﬁnal stage subgame, a Nash equilibrium in techno-
logical capabilities in the second stage subgame, and zero proﬁts in the ﬁrst stage subgame. Pairs
(p,w)l y i n ga b o v eS￿S￿ are associated with positive proﬁts for intermediate ﬁrms. This raises
the incentive for investment in technological capability, output expands, and the price/quality
ratio falls back to S￿S￿. Likewise, pairs (p,w)l y i n gb e l o wS￿S￿ lead to negative proﬁts for inter-
mediate ﬁrms. In this case the incentive for investment in technological capability is reduced,
intermediate output falls and the price/quality ratio of intermediate goods rises until S￿S￿ is
reached. Notice that in this process, the number of ﬁrms does not change. This occurs because
the adjustment now takes place through ﬁxed outlays, and this happens exactly so that after
stage 2 is played (choice of technological capability), there is no incentive for entry or exit.
The mechanism behind the slope of S￿S￿ is of a fundamentally diﬀerent nature than that
behind SS. Previously, in SS, as wages rose ﬁrms entered the intermediate goods industry,
thereby inducing a lower price for intermediate products. This made SS downward sloping for
low wage rates. Meanwhile, rising wages increased the marginal cost of intermediate output
(wc). The latter eﬀect dominated the slope of SS for high wage rates, making it positive. In
contrast, along S￿S￿, the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed (see equation 12). The slope of S￿S￿ again
depends on two eﬀects. On the one hand, as wages increase, rising technological capability makes
S￿S￿ downward sloping. On the other hand, increasing wages (and hence increasing marginal
cost of intermediate output, wc)m a k eS￿S￿ upward sloping.
With endogenous technological capability we still have two equilibria. The ﬁrst is E1,a s
in the exogenous technological capability case. For w>w T, E2 is replaced by E￿ w.T h i s i s
associated with the wage rate found in (17). It is easy to check that there is no optimal
deviation from E￿ w. To the left of E￿ w,w eh a v eD￿D￿ >S ￿S￿. This leads to positive proﬁts
in the intermediate industry. Thus, the incentive for investment in technological capability is
enhanced, the price/quality ratio of intermediate products falls, output of intermediate and ﬁnal
goods increases, less labor is employed in the ‘rest of the economy’, and wages rise. This shifts
the economy back to E￿ w. Conversely, to the right of E￿ w,w eﬁ n dt h a tD￿D￿ <S ￿S￿.T h i s
leads to losses in the intermediate goods industry. Incentives for investment in technological
capability are reduced, the price/quality ratio of intermediate goods increases, intermediate and
ﬁnal outputs fall, more workers are employed in the ‘rest of the economy’, wages fall, and the
16economy returns to E￿ w.
This completes the discussion of equilibria. We now discuss in more detail the consequences
of assumption A2 (namely, that θ −1 >β− ϕ). The conﬁguration presented in Figure 1 relies
upon this assumption, and the following discussion oﬀers more detail on how the economy works.
Substituting (14) and (10) into S￿S￿, it can be seen that S￿S￿ will be downward sloping in w
if θ − 1 >β− ϕ, upward sloping in w if θ − 1 <β− ϕ, and constant with respect to w if
θ − 1 = β − ϕ. Recall that the slope of S￿S￿ with respect to w depends on two eﬀects. First
we have that S￿S￿ rises linearly with w, through increases in the marginal cost of intermediate
products (wc). Secondly, technological capability is rising in w, and this tends to make S￿S￿
downward sloping in w.I fθ−1 >β−ϕ, the increasing technological capability eﬀect dominates
the increasing marginal cost eﬀect. This parameter restriction, namely θ − 1 >β− ϕ, has an
intuitive interpretation, to which we now turn. If θ is large, the wage function (equation 14)
increases relatively slowly. On the other hand, a small value of β −ϕ implies that the marginal
cost of building technological capability is relatively low (β is low), and/or the externality
(market expansion) eﬀect is relatively strong (ϕ is high). In this scenario the switch from E1 to
E￿ w is accompanied by a relatively slow-rising wage rate, and a relatively fast-rising technological
capability, which ensure that that S￿S￿ is downward sloping. The analysis of θ − 1 ￿ β − ϕ is
straightforward and is left to the reader.
To recap, the shape of SS and S￿S￿ results from the following mechanisms. Up to wT (on
SS) the price of intermediate goods is falling due to entry of ﬁrms in the intermediate industry,
and ceteris paribus, will eventually begin to rise due to increasing marginal costs of intermediate
output, wc.F o r w>w T (on S￿S￿), if θ − 1 >β− ϕ, endogenous investment in technological
capability gives a ‘second breath’ to the industrialization process, and although concentration in
the intermediate industry does not fall, competition in technological capability leads to a phase
of further reductions in the price/quality ratio for intermediate goods.
Shifting the economy from E1 to E￿ w (as opposed to shifting it to E2), requires that wT ∈
[wI,w E2]. In this case, the shift between E1 and E￿ w is accompanied by rising technological
capability. Most importantly, the wage rate associated with the high wage equilibrium without
investment in technological capability, wE2, is lower than the equilibrium wage with invest-
ment in technological capability, ￿ w. This will be shown formally in the proof of Proposition 4
(Appendix B).
Remark 3: A Window of Opportunity
For the switch from the low-income, coordination failure, equilibrium (E1)t ot h eh i g h -
income, developed-economy, equilibrium to be accompanied by an endogenous increase in tech-
nological capability, wT ∈ [wI,w E2] is required. This constitutes a window of opportunity for the
economy to increase its technological capability. We will see below that if the economy manages
to ﬁt through this window of opportunity, it achieves a higher wage rate than would have been
the case otherwise. The formal condition for wT ∈ [wI,w E2] is derived below (condition C6 in
section 4) ￿.
The conﬁguration shown in Figure 1 is not the only possibility, although (in our view) it
is the more interesting one. We close this section by considering the diﬀerent conﬁgurations
17of equilibria that may arise in the current framework. This is set out in Proposition 1. To


















C4. There is exactly one change of sign in the slope of SS for w ∈ (w∗,∞).
Proposition 1: Equilibrium Conﬁgurations
For w ￿ wT:
I) If C1 holds, then under A1a, A1b, C2, C3 and C4, there are two equilibria. One is given
by an intersection of DD and SS (denoted by E2). The other is given by the intersection of
DD and pm (denoted by E1).
II) If C1 does not hold, then the unique equilibrium is given by the intersection of DD and
pm (E1).
For w>w T, the equilibrium wage rate is given by ￿ w ￿.
The proof is provided in Appendix B. In the following section, we analyze the impact of
trade policy and its possible role in relieving coordination failure.
4. Trade Policy
We begin by considering the case of exogenous technological capabilities (u = 1)i nP r o p o -
sitions 2 and 3. The case of endogenous technological capabilities (u > 1)i st h et o p i co f
Propositions 4 and 5. Below, we interpret a change in tariﬀs for intermediate goods as a shift
in the value of pm, and a change in tariﬀs for ﬁnal goods as a shift in the value of q. The eﬀects
of tariﬀs on intermediate goods are discussed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Tariﬀs on Intermediate Goods with Exogenous Technological
Capabilities
If the economy is at E1, a tariﬀ reduction (increase) for intermediate goods raises (lowers)
output in both sectors. If tariﬀs fall suﬃciently, a switch from E1 to E2 is triggered. If the fall in
the price of intermediate imports is suﬃciently large, it will eliminate the intermediate industry
and shift the ﬁnal goods industry to a high production level, at the crossing of DD and pm ￿.
Proof: The eﬀect of increasing tariﬀs is to raise pm.H e n c eE1 shifts leftward along DD,
reducing intermediate and ﬁnal outputs and the wage rate (see Figure 1). Hence, increasing
tariﬀs for intermediate goods generates a contraction of both industries. Reducing tariﬀs on
intermediate goods lowers pm and moves E1 to the right, increasing output in both sectors.
If the tariﬀ reduction is suﬃcient to shift pm past the industrial take-oﬀ, then the economy
switches to E2.







θ−1. This speciﬁes the minimum of SS for w ∈ (w∗,∞).I fpm falls
below the price level associated with SS at wmin, then the price of imports after tariﬀs is too
low for the domestic intermediate industry to operate and the new equilibrium is given by the
intersection of DD and pm ￿.
18Proposition 2 says that tariﬀ reductions for intermediate goods can help domestic industry
to develop. Moreover, if the fall in the import price of intermediate goods is suﬃciently large,
the industry is eliminated, leaving the country with only the ﬁnal goods and rest of the economy
sectors. This is associated with a higher wage rate than if the intermediate goods industry
had survived, since the non-competitive nature of this industry imposes a negative (pecuniary)
externality on ﬁnal goods producers. This is the ﬁrst best outcome, which will be discussed in
section 5.
The following proposition considers trade policy for the ﬁnal goods industry.
Proposition 3: Tariﬀs on Final Goods with Exogenous Technological Capabilities
Increasing tariﬀs for ﬁnal goods raises output for both sectors. If the economy is initially
located at E1 and the tariﬀ increase is suﬃcient, a switch from equilibrium E1 to E2 can be
triggered ￿.
Proof: It is useful to relabel the horizontal axis in Figure 1. Note that q is ﬁxed throughout
the analysis, thus the horizontal axis can be relabelled as w/q. Then changes in q will shift DD,
while reﬂecting movements along SS ( a sw e l la sa l o n gDD). To see this, note that q enters





it is clear that changes in q not only generate movements along DD but also shifts in DD,i n
(p,w/q)-space.
A tariﬀ increase for ﬁnal goods is equivalent to increasing q. This will shift DD upward.
Equilibria E1 and E2 are shifted to the right, whereas the industrial take-oﬀ point moves leftward
and upward. Production increases for both sectors, regardless of whether the economy is at E2
or E1. However, if DD shifts past the intersection of pm and SS (point A in Figure 1), then an
industrial expansion to E2 is triggered ￿.
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that a combination of tariﬀ increases for ﬁnal goods producers
and tariﬀ reductions for intermediate goods has the potential to relieve coordination failure,
with the associated expansion of output and wages through industrialization.
Now consider the eﬀects of trade policy when technological capability is endogenous. The

























Proposition 4: Tariﬀs on Intermediate Goods with Endogenous Technological
Capabilities
Let the economy be at E1 and let C1-C6 hold, then:
I) A suﬃciently large reduction in intermediate output tariﬀs generates an industrial ex-
pansion which will shift the economy to E￿ w, and increase intermediate ﬁrms’ technological
capabilities.
II) E￿ w will feature a higher wage than E2.
19III) If tariﬀs are lowered suﬃciently, the intermediate industry ceases to exist.
Additionally,
i) wT ￿ ￿ w ⇔C5,
ii) wI ￿ wT ￿ wE2 ⇔C6, and
iii) wE2 ￿ ￿ w ⇔C5 ∧ C6 ￿.
The proof can be found in Appendix B. Proposition 4 speciﬁes the consequences of reducing
pm/u.I nF i g u r e1 ,o n c epm/u falls below the industrial take-oﬀ point, an industrial expansion
follows, and the economy switches to either E2 (if wT / ∈ [wI,w E2])o rt oE￿ w (if wT ∈ [wI,w E2]).
In the latter case, the equilibrium switch triggers a rise in technological capability once the
economy crosses the technological take-oﬀ, associated with wT.
If pm/u were to fall suﬃciently below E￿ w, the intermediate industry could not compete with
imports and would cease to exist. In this case, equilibrium would lie at the intersection of pm/u
and D￿D￿, and the economy would feature an even higher wage rate (which is the ﬁrst best, as in
the case of exogenous technological capabilities). To see this in Figure 1, shift pm/u downward
past E￿ w, and look for the new intersection of pm/u and D￿D￿.
Having set out the eﬀects of trade policy for the intermediate industry, we now discuss the
eﬀect of tariﬀs on the ﬁnal goods industry.
Proposition 5: Tariﬀs on Final Goods with Endogenous Technological Capabili-
ties
Tariﬀ increases for ﬁnal goods will expand output in both sectors, and if suﬃcient, can trigger
as w i t c hf r o mE1 to E￿ w ￿.
Proof: Recall that tariﬀ increases for ﬁnal goods can be modelled as an increase in q.
Relabel the horizontal axis in Figure 1 as w/q.I n (p/u,w/q)-space, S￿S￿ does not shift with
changes in q,w h i l eD￿D￿ does.
Increasing q will shift D￿D￿ upward. E1 and E￿ w shift rightward, and the industrial take-oﬀ
moves leftward and upward. Production increases in both sectors, regardless of whether the
economy is at E￿ w or E1.I fD￿D￿ shifts past the crossing between pm and SS (point A in Figure
1), then an expansion to E￿ w is triggered.
Regarding the technological take-oﬀ point (associatedwith wT), note that increases in q cause
proportionate shifts of wT and ￿ w. This, together with the upward shift in D￿D￿, guarantees that
if wT <w E2 held initially, it will continue to hold at the new level of q. Therefore, if the economy
featured the possibility of technological take-oﬀ at the initial q, this will still hold at the new q
￿.
5. The First Best Outcome and the Constrained Social Planner
So far we have focussed on the second best scenario, in which there is an oligopolistic in-
termediate industry. The imperfectly competitive nature of this industry introduces ineﬃciency
into the economy. Given the existence of the intermediate industry, we have asked: what can be
done to increase the wage rate? In principle, we can ask the same question while entertaining
the possibility of doing away with the intermediate industry.
20From Figure 1 it is clear that industrialization would, at best, achieve E2 (for u = 1)o r
E￿ w (for u > 1). Letting the price of imports fall suﬃciently below the price levels associated
with either of these equilibria leads to the demise of the intermediate industry (as shown in
Propositions 2 and 4). In this case, wages are even higher, and are given by the intersection of
DD and pm. The demise of the imperfectly competitive intermediate industry means that the
economy would be constituted by a perfectly competitive industry and by the residual ‘rest of
the economy’ sector. The extra labor demand generated through increased eﬃciency (that is,
through reductions in the price of intermediate goods) more than compensates for the loss of
jobs in the intermediate industry. Such a (ﬁrst best) scenario is, however, hard to defend: any
proposal to scrap a whole industry will meet strong resistance from stakeholders. It is in this
spirit that second best analysis becomes valuable.
We now consider whether a social planner could improve upon the decentralized equilibrium.
The type of social planner we consider is a constrained one, in the sense that the social planner is
assumed not to be able to implement the ﬁrst best outcome, but is constrained to operate within
the second best scenario (in which the intermediate industry is operative). Since consumers have
not been modelled explicitly, there is no clear candidate for a social welfare objective (usually
based on consumers’ utility functions). Nonetheless, we can make progress by using real income
as the planner’s objective. While this is not entirely satisfactory, it is nonetheless a useful
benchmark. Income is constituted by wages and net proﬁts accruing from the intermediate
industry (Recall that both the ﬁnal goods industry and the ‘rest of the economy’ feature zero










where Le is the economy’s labor endowment, w = qY 1/θ is labor market clearing wage given by
(14), q is the price of the ﬁnal good, Y is ﬁnal output, and Πi =( pi − wc)xi −wεu
β
i is the net
proﬁt of an intermediate ﬁrm. The ﬁnal goods industry is perfectly competitive and as such
oﬀers no scope for government intervention, so the planner takes this as given. To maximize the
objective in (18), the social planner uses a three stage procedure, similar to that used in seeking
a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the intermediate industry. First, the planner solves for
the optimal production quantity. Technological capability is chosen next, and then the number
of ﬁrms is chosen. In choosing quantity, the planner selects marginal cost pricing (pi = wc).










To obtain an expression for Y in terms of u, the social planner uses the ﬁnal goods production
function, Y = (Ly/α)
α
￿￿N+1
i=1 xi/(1 − α)
￿1−α
. Focussing on the symmetric case, substitute Ly
and
￿N+1
i=1 xi with the conditional factor demands given in (2) and (3). Noting that w/q = Y 1/θ,
this yields Y 1/θ = (uϕ/c)
1−α, which is usedto express (19) interms of u.C h o o s i n gu to maximize















This is then substituted back into the objective to solve for the social planner’s optimal number
of ﬁrms (NSP +1). Noting that the objective is decreasing in the number of ﬁrms, the ﬁrst best
outcome entails the elimination of the intermediate industry. The second best market structure
from the planner’s perspective is a national monopoly (NSP +1=1), which prices at marginal
cost and exhibits a level of technological capability given by (20). This is an intuitive result, for
if the social planner is imposing marginal cost pricing and controlling technological capability in
the intermediate industry, there are no beneﬁts from competition in the intermediate industry:
duplication of investment in technological capability by having more than a single ﬁrm does
not make sense. The wage rate implied by this is obtained by substituting uSP and NSP into
w/q =( uϕ/c)












It remains to ask: under what conditions will the centrally planned solution yield higher real
income? To answer this, we calculate the diﬀerence between decentralized real income and the











Note that in the decentralized equilibrium, net proﬁts in the intermediate industry are zero (by
free entry). Meanwhile, in the centrally planned outcome, ﬁxed costs must be deducted from
wage income (as a consequence of marginal cost pricing), and there is a national monopoly:
NSP + 1=1 . To specify when the centrally planned solution will lead to higher real income
than the decentralized equilibrium, ﬁrst consider the case of u>1. Substituting ￿ w from (17),

























β +ϕ(1 − α)
.
The centrally planned solution leads to a level of real income which is lower than, higher than,
or equal to the decentralized equilibrium if the above expression is positive, negative, or zero,
respectively. Admissible parameter values can be found such that any of these outcomes can
arise. Thus, the social planner may not yield higher real income relative to the decentralized
solution.
Now consider the case of u = 1. In this case, the centrally planned wage is obtained by
substituting p = wc (which corresponds with SS in the centrally planned case) into q = wαp1−α
17Note that if ϕ =0 ,t h e nu
SP =1 : from the social planner’s perspective, it is the market expansion externality
which justiﬁes investment in technological capability.
22(which corresponds with DD). This yields wSP = q/c1−α. To ascertain whether this yields a
higher real income, we need to check whether (22) is positive, negative or zero. To this end,
substitute wSP = q/c1−α,s e tuSP = 1 and replace ￿ w with wE2 in (22). However, wE2 cannot be
solved explicitly, so the analysis relies on numerical simulation. These results are not reported,
since no fundamental new insights are obtained.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we endogenized technological capability choice at the ﬁrm level, in the context
of a coordination failure framework. This extension allows for a richer setting in which ﬁrms’ de-
velopment of technological capability is the result of a strategic choice. Moreover, the extension
has uncovered new mechanisms central to the interaction between industrialization and ﬁrms’
technological capabilities. In particular, Rostow’s (1956, 1959) view of the development process
as a series of stages which the economy must traverse is reassessed, and the revised view that
emerges is somehow reminiscent of that theory. However, the take-oﬀs themselves bear little
resemblance to Rostow’s original framework. We now have an industrial take-oﬀ,w h i c ht r i g g e r s
industrialization. Subsequently, there is a technological take-oﬀ, and an associated window of
opportunity, which the economy must cross in order to achieve growth in technological capabil-
ity. If the economy manages to cross both take-oﬀs, industrialization proceeds along with entry
into high-industries, and the economy will achieve a higher level of income than if it crosses
the industrial take-oﬀ, but not the technological take-oﬀ. In the latter case, the industrializa-
tion process is foiled, and the economy cannot achieve entry into high-tech industries. Thus,
industrialization proceeds along a low-tech trajectory.
The implications for trade policy are as follows. With exogenous technological capability, a
prudent mix of tariﬀ reductions for intermediate goods and tariﬀ increases for ﬁnal goods raises
output in both sectors, as well as the wage rate. If tariﬀ reductions for intermediate goods (tariﬀ
increases for ﬁnal goods) are large enough, a large output expansion (equilibrium switch) can be
triggered. These results are in line with those in Venables (1996). If the changes in tariﬀs are
even larger, the intermediate industry can be eliminated, in which case the economy is left only
with the perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods industry and the rest of the economy sector. Since
imperfect competition in the intermediate industry introduces ineﬃciency into the economy, the
demise of this industry leads to the ﬁrst best outcome, which is associated with even higher
wages.
In the endogenous technological capability setting, a combination of prudent tariﬀ reductions
for the intermediate sector together with tariﬀ increases for the ﬁnal goods sector still induces an
industrial expansion, which could now be accompanied by an increase in technological capability.
Investment in technological capability will take place if the technological take-oﬀ is associated
with a suﬃciently low wage rate. If the technological take-oﬀ wage rate is too high, the tech-
nological take-oﬀ is bypassed. In this case the economy misses the window of opportunity, and
ends up with a thwarted process of industrialization in which technological capability does not
rise. Thus, even though the economy industrializes, the industries into which it successfully
enters will be technologically backward and the economy achieves a lower wage rate than if the
technological take-oﬀ had been crossed. The key notion is that in order to avoid foiling the
process of industrialization, the wage rate cannot rise too steeply along the transition towards
23the high-wage equilibrium. Otherwise, it runs the risk of impeding entry into technologically
advanced industries.
The model sheds light on some possible reasons why many developing countries have managed
to partially industrialize, while very few countries managed to enter successfully into high-
technology industries. In particular, the importance of keeping wage growth in check has been
highlighted. In a sense, this is bad news for development policy: it implies that in order to
successfully enter into high-techindustries, the transitionprocess may needto be accompaniedby
policies that restrain wage growth. Thus, one of the main mechanisms to sustain public support
for industrialization needs to be curtailed. Moreover, nations with relatively higher initial wage
rates are less likely to ﬁt through the window of opportunity. Such relatively high initial wage
rates could, perhaps, be due to factors such as favorable natural resource endowments: the
‘resource curse’or ‘dutchdisease’ (Corden, 1984). This may be particularly relevant to the case of
Latin America, as compared to the North-East Asian economies. The importance of restraining
wage growth is emphasized by Amsden (1989). Analyzing the industrialization process for South
Korea, Amsden comes to the conclusion that one of the factors which explains South Korean
success, is that wage growth was kept below labor productivity growth.
The model also has an interesting historical application. This relates to the ﬁrst indus-
trial revolution in late eighteenth century Europe, as compared to subsequent industrialization
processes which have often been accompanied by the emergence of (proﬁt directed) research and
development. It could be argued that ﬁrms in the ﬁrst industrial revolution operated roughly
in accordance with the exogenous technological capability case. Thus, the industrial expansion
which characterized the period was one where production of manufactured goods expanded, but
ﬁrms’ technological capabilities did not expand to a large extent. Soon after, ﬁrms began to
actively set up research and development departments. The quintessential example of this is
Thomas Edison18, who set up possibly the ﬁrst organized research eﬀort aimed at the generation
of proﬁt, eventually leading to the consolidation of General Electric. This eﬀectively meant that
technological capability became an endogenous investment for ﬁrms. Since then, the nature of
industrial expansion has changed fundamentally, and this is captured in our model by the en-
dogenous technological capabilities case: once ﬁrms begin investing in technological capability,
falls in intermediate industry concentration cease to be the driving force of cost reductions to the
ﬁnal goods industry. Falls in the price/quality ratio are now driven by the rising technological
capability of intermediate goods producers. Both reduced concentration and rising technologi-
cal capability in the intermediate goods industry lead to reductions in the price/quality ratio of
intermediate goods, which expands output in the intermediate and ﬁnal goods industries, and
reduces employment in the rest of the economy. As fewer workers are employed in the rest of
the economy, their marginal product increases, and this raises wages for the whole economy.
Introducing a constrained social planner whose objective is to maximize real income leads
to the conclusion that a national monopoly is the second best market structure, provided the
planner can enforce marginal cost pricing and choose technological capability in the intermediate
industry. The centrally planned solution will lead to higher real income only under certain
parameter values. The implication is that careful analysis of country and industry characteristics
18We are grateful to John Quiggin for drawing our attention to this example.
24(captured here by parameter values) is essential before espousing a centrally planned approach.
There is no guarantee that a central planner can achieve a better outcome than the decentralized
equilibrium.
Finally, when the international price of intermediate goods is lower than the domestic price
achievable in the high-income equilibrium, the ﬁrst best entails the demise of the imperfectly
competitive intermediate industry, leading to higher wages. However, such a proposal will likely
meet strong opposition from stakeholders, and political economy considerations render second
best analysis increasingly attractive.
Extensions for Further Research
An interesting extension is to consider the possibility that domestic intermediate ﬁrms be-
come suﬃciently competitive to produce at a price/quality ratio which is equal to or less than
the international price/quality ratio. The international price/quality ratio can be represented
as a horizontal line in Figure 1, lying below the price/quality ratio of imports (the diﬀerence
between the two lines being the wedge introduced by tariﬀs on intermediate goods). If domestic
producers become suﬃciently eﬃcient to be able to access the international market, there will be
a third take-oﬀ point: international take-oﬀ. As the economy crosses this point, it will capture a
share of the international market. As before, this expansion may (or may not) be accompanied
by an increase in technological capability, depending on whether the technological take-oﬀ point
is crossed (that is, whether or not the economy ﬁts through the window of opportunity). Given
this third type of take-oﬀ, it is natural to wonder whether there might be further take-oﬀs or
threshold points. At this stage, this is an open question, and is left for future research.
Also of interest is the reversal of the intermediate and ﬁnal goods sectors: We can imagine
a situation in which it is the ﬁnal goods sector where the imperfectly competitive behavior lies,
while the intermediate sector is perfectly competitive. This extension could perhaps draw on
the literature relating to the hold-up problem (Hart, 1995).
Several restrictions on parameter values have been used. This raises questions about the
likelihood of these restrictions holding in actual economies. In the absence of inference about
the underlying distributions of these parameters, it is diﬃcult to say anything about the matter.
This issue seems something best settled empirically, and lies outside the scope of a theoretical
study.
Various possibilities for government intervention, taking the form of trade policy and social
planner analysis, have been uncovered. Such results could be used by vested interests for rent
seeking purposes (Bhagwati, 1982). The eﬃciency losses from such eﬀorts can reach a consider-
able magnitude and should not be understated (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Moreover,
in the light of the current framework of multilateral tariﬀ agreements, is not at all clear how a
small economy could go about implementing these policy prescriptions. Perhaps this calls for a
reconsideration of how such multilateral agreements are designed, and whether in their present
form they are welfare improving for developing countries.
25A. Deriving the solved-out proﬁt function












uixi = wc. (A.2)
From (A.2) solve for uixi and sum this over all ﬁrms. This yields:
￿N+1





























































xi, pi and πi are, respectively, equations (6), (7) and (8) in the main body of the paper.
B. Longer Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
L e tu sa n a l y z et h ec a s ew ￿ wT ﬁrst. We examine the basic properties that are required of
DD, SS and pm, and then show how these properties are met. Finally, it is shown that the cases
of zero or strictly more than two equilibria can be ruled out. It will be useful to keep Figure 1
in mind.
To see why C1-C4 are necessary (and taken together, suﬃcient), consider C1-C3. To obtain
two crossings between DD and SS, there must be three ranges for w. Firstly, for w ∈ (w∗,w I),
SS > DD (condition C3). Secondly, for w ∈ [wI,w E2], SS ￿ DD (condition C1). Finally,
for w ∈ (wE2,∞), SS > DD (condition C2). This guarantees at least two crossings (at least
one tangency point, if C1 holds with equality). Including condition C4 guarantees exactly two
crossings (exactly one tangency point, if condition C1 holds with equality).
Let us analyze condition C1 ﬁrst, assuming conditions C2-C4 hold. To guarantee that SS
and DD cross, a range where SS <DD is a necessary condition. This range is deﬁned by two
wage rates, as follows: w ∈ [wI,w E2]. Condition C1 is necessary and suﬃcient for SS < DD.
26To see this, consider the case when SS is tangent to DD.I nt h i sc a s eDD
SS has a maximum at
















wp,i n t oDD
SS and imposing the condition DD
SS > 1,y i e l d sC 1 .
Now consider condition C2: as w →∞ , DD
SS → 0 and C2 holds. To check that C3 holds,
let w → w∗ from above. Then SS →∞and DD → DD(w∗), which is ﬁnite. This yields
SS > DD.T o c h e c k C 4 , s e t ∂SS









In order to have at least one ﬁrm in the intermediate industry, A1a implies an upper bound
on pm, which is deﬁned by pm <D D (w∗). Performing this calculation yields A1b. For w>w ∗
there is at least one ﬁrm in the intermediate industry. For pm higher than the upper bound, the
domestic intermediate industry is non-existent (as it would contain less than one ﬁrm).
It remains to show that zero and more than two equilibria cannot exist. Consider the zero
equilibrium case. If there is no equilibrium, pm and DD do not cross (E1 does not exist) and C1
does not hold. pm is simply a horizontal line, while DD is a hyperbola, hence they will always
cross - unless pm is exactly zero (an unfeasible price). Therefore, E1 always exists.
To exclude strictly more than two equilibria, note that E1 always exists. We know (Remark
2) that the industrial take oﬀ point is not an equilibrium. So what is required is that there be
more than two crossings of SS and DD. By C2 and C3, the number of crossings of SS and DD
will be even. To see this, note that SS > DD as w → w∗ and as w → ∞, hence an odd number
of crossings is not possible. To exclude an even number of crossings higher than two, note that
this would require more than one change in the slope of SS, but this would violate C4.
Finally, in the case of w>w T the equilibrium wage rate (￿ w)i so b t a i n e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 7 )￿.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The conﬁguration shown in Figure 1 accords with Proposition 4. C1-C4 hold to guarantee
that DD and SS cross exactly twice (see Proposition 1).
Part I follows similar reasoning to Proposition 2: If tariﬀs for intermediate goods are reduced
suﬃciently (pm/u falls below the industrial take-oﬀ point), equilibrium E1 ceases to exist and
the economy switches to E￿ w.
To see how i, ii and iii relate to parts I, II, and III, consider each of the former:
i) For an endogenous increase in technological capabilities to take place, the technological
t a k e - o ﬀw a g er a t e( wT) must lie below the equilibrium wage rate ( ￿ w). This will hold if and
only if ￿ w/wT ￿ 1. Substituting ￿ w and wT from (17) and (15), respectively, yields C5. ‘i’ is a
necessary condition for part I.
ii) Industrialization will be characterized by an increase in technological capabilities if and
only if wT ∈ [wI,w E2]. Substituting wT into the equilibrium condition (16) yields condition C6.
‘ii’ is another necessary condition for part I.
iii) In order to have ￿ w ￿ wE2 (part II), it is useful to plot the expression in (16). This can
be seen in Figure 2, where the left hand side (labelled LHS, equal to c) has been plotted against























Figure 2. SS = DD (equation 16), exogenous technological capability.
In Figure 2 it can be seen that for w ￿ wE2 to hold, we require LHS￿RHS. This is also the
condition required for ￿ w ￿ wE2. However, the latter also holds for ￿ w ￿ wI. In order to rule
o u tt h i sc a s e ,b o t hC 5( o r‘ i ’ )a n dC 6( o r‘ i i ’ )a r en e c e s s a r y .S u b s t i t u t i n g ￿ w into the equilibrium







































which holds for all admissible parameter values. C5 and C6 are each necessary for ‘iii’, and
together they are suﬃcient. Parts II and ‘iii’ are equivalent.
F o rp a r tI I I ,i ft h et a r i ﬀi sr e d u c e ds u c ht h a tpm/u < S￿S￿(￿ w), the intermediate industry will
not be able to attain a positive market share unless S￿S￿ shifts down to pm/u.T h en u m b e ro f
ﬁrms needs to adjust in order to shift S￿S￿ down. To see whether the number of ﬁrms needs to












> 0 ⇐⇒ N>2+β − ϕ.









< 2+β−ϕ. This places
the analysis in case (a).S of o rS￿S￿ to shift down, the number of ﬁrms must rise (∂S￿S￿
∂N < 0). If,
whilst rising, N +1reaches 3+β − ϕ,t h e n∂S￿S￿
∂N =0and S￿S￿ cannot shift down any further.
Moreover, if N + 1 > 3+β − ϕ,t h e n∂S￿S￿
∂N > 0 and what is required in order to shift S￿S￿
down is a fall in the number of ﬁrms. However, this can make N + 1 < 3+β − ϕ,i nw h i c h
case the number of ﬁrms must rise. Thus, unless S￿S￿ reaches pm/u whilst N + 1 < 3+β − ϕ
still holds, intermediate industry market structure cannot adjust, and the intermediate industry
does not achieve a positive market share. As with exogenous technological capabilities, the
economy achieves a higher wage rate in this case (the ﬁrst best). Also, note that, relative to the
exogenous technological capabilities case, the intermediate industry becomes more resilient to
falls in pm/u below the high wage equilibrium. In the exogenous technological capabilities case,
to eliminate the intermediate industry all that was required was to have pm smaller than the
minimum of SS (see Proposition 2). In the endogenous technological capabilities case, however,
the fall in pm/u must be large enough to make the adjustment in the number of intermediate
ﬁrms insuﬃcient for S￿S￿ to reach pm/u ￿.
C. Comparative Statics
For each parameter, we ﬁrst consider the case of exogenous technological capabilities. We
then look at the case of endogenous technological capabilities. Recall that we have assumed
1 ￿ q ￿ w.
α : With exogenous technological capabilities and under A1a, the eﬀect of increasing α is to
shift SS up. DD will shift down if q<w . In this case, there is a value of α above which the
only equilibrium is E1. This is deﬁned by C1, taking other parameters as given. Moreover, by
reducing α a switch from E1 to E2 can be triggered. This deﬁnes a value of α below which the
only equilibrium is E2 (The reasoning is similar to Proposition 3.).
With endogenous technological capabilities, an explicit solution for w has been obtained
in equation (17). Thus we can ascertain comparative statics by inspection of the latter. If
β>ϕ[θ −α(θ −1)], ￿ w is decreasing in α.I fβ<ϕ[θ − α(θ − 1)], ￿ w can be (but not necessarily
is) increasing in α and the shift in S￿S￿ would be smaller than the shift in D￿D￿. wT is increasing
in α (see 15). Thus for β >ϕ[θ − α(θ −1)], there exists a value of α above which an increase
in technological capabilities does not occur.
θ : With exogenous technological capabilities, θ does not aﬀect DD.P r o v i d e d w/q < 1,
(w/q)
θ−1 is decreasing in θ and SS shifts downward as θ increases. The value of θ below which
only E1 exists, is given by C1 (other parameters being held constant). There is also a value of
θ above which industrialization is triggered.
With endogenous technological capabilities, increases in θ shift both D￿D￿ and S￿S￿ down.
For β>ϕ[θ −α(θ −1)], ￿ w is increasing in θ and S￿S￿ shifts by more than D￿D￿. The opposite
holds if β<ϕ[θ − α(θ − 1)]. wT is decreasing in θ.I fβ >ϕ[θ − α(θ − 1)], there is a value of θ
below which wT > ￿ w and it will not be optimal to invest in technological capability.
c : With exogenous technological capabilities, increasing c only aﬀects SS by shifting it up.
Thus, there exists a value of c (deﬁned by C1) above which only E1 exists. There is also a value
of c below which the economy ends up at E2.
With endogenous technological capabilities, changes in c do not aﬀect D￿D￿.A s w i t h e x -
29ogenous technological capabilities, increasing c shifts S￿S￿ u p .T h i si sr e ﬂ e c t e di n￿ w, which is
decreasing in c so long as β>ϕ[θ − α(θ − 1)]. wT does not depend on c. Consequently, there
exists a value of c above which there is no investment in technological capability.
ε : With endogenous technological capabilities, the eﬀects are similar to those of c.T h ev a l u e
of ε above which only E1 exists is also deﬁned by C1, other parameters being held constant.
Values of ε below a certain threshold generate a shift towards E2.
With endogenous technological capabilities and if β>ϕ [θ − α(θ − 1)], ￿ w is decreasing in
ε.R i s i n g ε is associated with upward shifts in D￿D￿ and S￿S￿,w i t ht h es h i f ti nS￿S￿ being
greater. wT is increasing in ε. This means that there is a value of ε above which investment in
technological capability does not take place.
ϕ : Under A2, ￿ w increases with ϕ,w h e r e a swT is not aﬀected. Rising ϕ shifts S￿S￿ down
and D￿D￿ up.
β : wT is increasing in β.H o w e v e r ,￿ w is non-monotonic in β.I f A 2 h o l d s ,￿ w is at ﬁrst
decreasing and later increasing in β. Thus there exists a value of β for which ∂ ￿ w/∂β = 0.
The eﬀects of q are presented in Propositions 3 and 5, whilst those of pm are discussed in
Propositions 2 and 4.
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